




















The behavioral economics literature on time discounting has suggested that
individuals may systematically undersave when planning for retirement. Hence,
pension systems have developed to enable, or indeed force, individuals to save
more for retirement. Of course, the saving aspect and the timing of retirement
are connected, in the sense that the expected length of retirement determines what
is meant by adequate post-retirement resources, and vice versa. Despite this, the
timing aspect rarely enters into policy discussions, although the same behavioural
phenomena that lead to undersaving – in this paper, myopia and present bias – may
also have implications for the retirement decision. Moreover, the form of pension
payments may also affect the timing decision when individuals do not have time
consistent preferences.
This paper presents a model of saving and retirement timing where saving rates
are mandated, and pension payment may come in either a lump-sum or an annuity.
It tests the model using data collected through a new experiment. The experiment
presented has a particular novel feature which made it uniquely suited for testing
the theoretical model. Speciﬁcally, participants in the experiment came back to the
laboratory on a weekly basis over a two month period. This decision to return to
the laboratory (or, to leave the experiment and collect a pension) became in itself
the main variable of interest. The experiment therefore exploited the effort it takes
for participants to come to the laboratory to capture preferences over time-use and
leisure.
The results shown that plans over leaving the experiment tend not to reﬂect
preferences, whilst actual leaving times were lower for more impulsive individuals
and those who gave up more time to participate. This suggests a tradeoff between
increasing saving through pension systems and earlier retirement. Payment group
had no effect on retirement timing, most likely because the small rewards meant
participants were indifferent between the two forms of payment. The results sug-
gest individuals may have time-inconsistent preferences over leisure choices, lead-
ing to the incidences of unplanned early retirement.1 Introduction
The decision about when to retire is inﬂuenced by a number of factors, including both
personal factors such as health, which affects the expected length of retirement and
the relative utility from leisure or the cost of work, and family arrangements, and ﬁ-
nancial factors such as pension wealth, entitlement to state beneﬁts and personal sav-
ings. Hence, the design of pension schemes is obviously crucial. There are issues for
policymakers thinking about pensions and retirement in both the accumulation and de-
cumulation phase. For example, it is a well known result that many deﬁned beneﬁt
schemes alter incentives to retire by increasing entitlements for each additional year
worked above the actuarially fair rate. However, academic and policy discussion relat-
ingtothedesignofpensionschemesoftenfocusheavilyonthesavingaspectretirement
planning. The behavioral economics literature on time discounting has suggested that
individuals may systematically undersave when planning for retirement. Hence, pen-
sion systems have developed to enable, or indeed force, individuals to save more for
retirement1.
Of course, the saving aspect and the timing of retirement are connected, in the
sensethat theexpectedlengthofretirementdetermineswhatis meantbyadequatepost-
retirement resources, and vice versa. Despite this, the timing aspect rarely enters into
policy discussions, althoughthe same behaviouralphenomenathat lead to undersaving
may also have implications for the retirement decision. For example, the tendency of
individuals to overvalue immediate consumption relative to later consumption is re-
ferred to as present bias – such individuals are referred to in this paper as myopic. It
is captured in this paper by a speciﬁc form of present-biased time preferences known
as hyperbolic discounting (Laibson, 1997). In terms of saving, this re-evaluation of
immediate utility leads to higher consumption (and lower saving) than planned in pre-
1There are a number of other reasons for the participation of the state in providing for retirement, set
out in Diamond (1977) such as market failures in certain insurance markets, redistribution within and across
generations and administrative cost efﬁciencies. However, the paternalism argument is a key feature of any
policy discussion (see DWP, 2006, on reforms for encouraging individuals to save more)
3viousperiods. Some authors(e.g. DiamondandKoszegi, 2003;Bassi, 2008;Frogneux,
2009) have introduced these preference into consumption of leisure, leading to over-
consumptionofleisure whichmayresult inunplannedearlyretirement. Holmes (2011)
observed that policies designed to overcome undersaving (due to hyperbolic discount-
ing) make unplanned earlier retirement more affordable, leading to a situation where
attempting to resolve on set of time-inconsistent choices may cause other undesirable
inconsistencies in a different area.
On the decumulation side of pension design, it is the size of a pension payout,
rather than the form it takes which is seen as important within the existing literature.
Under certain conventional assumptions about individual preferences, the choice be-
tween lump-sum or annuity, in an actuarially fair system, should have no effect on the
retirement decision. Such analysis usually considers individuals with standard, time-
consistent preference, operating in perfect capital markets. However, as the model
developedinthis paperwill show,myopicindividualswhoreceivetheirpensionslump-
sum experiencemuchgreaterincentivesto take unplannedearlyretirement. Thepayoff
to doing this is the extra utility from additional periods of leisure. A lump-sum pension
payment reduces the costs of lower retirement consumption by allowing the retiree the
possibility of much larger consumption in the immediate period, whereas an annuity
receiver is limited to just the fraction of total wealth he or she receives in that period
(assuming there are some form of credit constraints, so that individuals can not cost-
lessly borrow against their annuity stream). Generally speaking, very little attention
has been placed on the decumulation phase of the saving process in either academic
or policy work, aside from papers which emphasize the utility costs of increased ex-
posure to longevity risk arising from a shortage of actuarially fairly priced annuities.
Evidencethatannuitiesreduceincentivesforunplannedearlyretirementwoulddemon-
strate another potential cost of thin annuity markets both to the individual – unplanned
early retirement tends to lower some measure of overall lifecycle utility relative to
4time-consistent plans, leading to regret – and the state and taxpayers, due to increased
incidence of inadequate saving and the need for additional ﬁnancial support to retirees.
This papers tests a model of retirement and saving using data collected through a
new experiment. The experiment presented has a particular novel feature which made
it uniquely suited for testing the theoretical model. Speciﬁcally, participants in the
experiment came back to the laboratory on a weekly basis over a two month period.
This decision to return to the laboratory (or, to leave the experiment) became in itself
the main variable of interest. The experiment therefore exploited the effort it takes for
participants to come to the laboratory to capture preferences over time-use and leisure.
The design of the experiment looked at two issues. Firstly, it looks at how in-
dividuals may be time-inconsistent in making plans and choices about leisure. Indi-
viduals were asked at the beginning of the experiment which future week they would
like to leave the experiment in. The participants were not held to this choice, and
were free to leave in whichever week they wanted. Within experimental approaches
to time-inconsistency, the overwhelming focus is on choices over money or consump-
tion, although there are a few other novel examples – for example, time-inconsistent
preferences over long-run projects (Akin and Yavas, 2008) or environmental policies
(Viscusi et al., 2008). This experiment is, to my knowledge, the ﬁrst designed specif-
ically to capture time inconsistency in leisure choices. Secondly, the experiment tests
the role of annuity pension payment in the context of the retirement decision. Contrary
to the theoretical model set out in this paper, there is a view in the literature that lump-
sum payments should increase the retirement age (Orzag, 2001; Fatas et al., 2007),
and so such payments may help deal with problems relating to the ageing population.
I will argue that this existing evidence comes from experiments that do not feature a
time componentand consequently,do not allow for preferencereversal. Therefore,this
experiment provides a more comprehensive test of the theory.
These hypotheses are important to future policy debates about retirement, savings
5and pensions. Firstly, policy is often focused on ensuring individuals save adequately
for retirement, but little attention is given to the retirement decision. The model of
Diamond and Koszegi (2003) suggests that the two need to be considered in tandem.
To support this claim, it is essential to demonstrate the role that discounting may have
on the retirement decision. Secondly, it should refocus discussion on the payout phase
of pensions and saving schemes, an area which often been neglected in favor of the
accumulation phase. Thin annuity markets are considered a problem because of the
utilitycosts theyimposeonrisk-averseindividualslookingtoinsurethemselvesagainst
longevity risk, as discussed above. There may be another cost resulting from more
unplanned early retirement if individuals ﬁnd they are limited to lump-sum payments
because annuities are unfairly priced and limited in supply.
This paper is set out as follows. The next section sets out the motivation for con-
ductingthisexperimentandidentiﬁesa theoreticalandempiricalgap. Themodelsetout
in this section leads to the a number of testable hypotheses. Section 4 describes the
proposed experiment and the methodology that will be used to test these hypotheses.
Section 5 discusses the study and the data collected. Section 6 presents the results
and section 7concludes. As with all experimental approaches, it is important to distin-
guish between what has been shown in a lab setting, and what can be inferred in the
real world. The conclusion emphasizes what lessons can be learned from this work in
policy terms, and where further investigation may be usefully directed.
2 A theory of saving and retirement
Inthissection,atheoryofretirementispresentedwhereindividualshavetime-inconsistent
preferences and payments from savings may come in different forms. In doing so, it
provides a critique of existing evidence about the relationship between retirement and
pension payments, and sets out a model which leads to a number of testable hypothe-
ses which existing evidence is unable to provide any insight into, pointing towards the
6need for a new approach.
2.1 Quasi-hyperbolicdiscounting, retirement and pensionpayments
Decision-makingovertime dependson the way individualsvalueimmediateand future
payoffs (where payoffs can be consumption, leisure or some other activity which gives
affects their utility). There is no a priori reason to suppose that individuals discount
future utility in such a way as to lead to time consistent plans (Strotz, 1956), and as a
result, there is a large literature on the consequences of individuals who are myopic,
impulsive and struggle with self-control.
There are numerous approaches to capturing myopic choice. Perhaps the most
prominent are models with hyperbolic discounting. The hyperbolic discount function
has the property of discounting utility more heavily in between two periods near to the
present than between two identically-spacedperiods furtheraway in the future. If D(t)
is the discount function, with t being the time until receiving utility, then D(t)= 1
ξ+Γt
is a common speciﬁcation for hyperbolic discounting, where ξ and Γ are constants.
I use the analytically convenient variant of hyperbolic discounting model: quasi-








In this formulation, δ is the conventional exponential discount factor, while β cap-
tures the extent to which individuals have a bias for utility today and are impulsive is
their choices. A non-myopic individual is deﬁned as one with β =1 , whilst a my-
opic quasi-hyperbolic discounter has β<1. The quasi-hyperbolic discounting model
maintains the property that delaying immediate consumption is more costly than de-
laying later consumption, but keeps some of the analytical simplicity of exponential
7discounting. It is especially useful in discrete time models (Laibson, 1997).
The work of Diamond and Koszegi (2003) was the ﬁrst to show an application of
the quasi-hyperbolicdiscounting model to choices over retirement timing, where plans
overwhen to take retirementmaybe time-inconsistentin the sense that individualstake
unplanned early retirement. Holmes (2010) demonstrate that in some circumstances,
thesamemyopicpreferenceswhichdrivethepossibilityoftime-inconsistentretirement
timing keep savings low enough so that this is avoided. Building on that, Holmes
(2011) argues that any mechanism which is designed to overcome inconsistent saving
plans by committing the individual to higher saving rates may, at the same time, lead
to unplanned early retirement. This may be conditional on the retiree having access to
enough of his savings at the earlier retirement date. These elements are introduced in
the following section.
2.2 Model
Consider an individual who lives for three periods, where they supply a unit of labour
in eachperiodpriortothe retirementperiod,R.I flt is thelaboursupplyin eachperiod,
then lt =1if t<R , and lt =0otherwise. In each period that they work, they receive
a wage w. In each period that they are retired, they receive leisure utility e. Utility
from leisure is assumed separable from consumption utility. Individuals may retire in
the second or third period: R = {2,3}. There is a survival probability in each period,
so Pr(alive in period 2—alive in period 1) = p and Pr(alive in period 3—alive in
period 2) = q. Therefore, Pr(alive in period 3) = pq
Theyare membersofan actuariallyfair deﬁnedbeneﬁtscheme, so there is an initial
wealth, W0, a contribution rate, s, and a series of known pay-outs upon retirement.
Speciﬁcally, if they receive a lump-sum payment and the individual retires in period 2
, then they receive a pension payment of W0+s
p . If they delay retirement to period 3,
they receive a pension payment of W0+2s
pq . Furthermore, if they receive these assets as
8an annuity, they receive W0+s
p(1+q) in each period if they retire in period 2. Obviously, if
they delay until period 3, their payment is identical regardless of their group.
Individualshavequasi-hyperbolicdiscountfunctionsandconstantrelativeriskaver-
sion utility functions. Assume for simplicity that saving interest and exponential dis-
count rates are zero, that borrowing is not possible, and that all individuals are charac-
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(2.2)
Finally, an individual in a lump-sum scheme who retires in the second period can





















The decision over the optimal planned retirement period is found by a comparison of
utility from R =2with utility for R =3 , assessed from the perspective of period 1.

























































This can be solved to give a condition on e:



























where 1 >γ≥ 0. Following a similar calculation for an annuity scheme member,
an individual would plan to retire in period 2 if:

















From these two conditions is is easy that the value of e is an important determining
factor. This leads to the following prediction:
Hypothesis 1: Individuals with a higher utility of leisure should plan to retire earlier.
The effect of the lump-sum (relative to the annuity) is seen by comparing the right
hand side of equations (2.5) and (2.6). A larger right hand side value for the lump-sum
equation implies that there will be some individuals who would retire earlier if they




























































It can be shown that this is satisﬁed if γ is greater than zero and either β or q are
less than one (if one of these conditions is not true, then the two sides are equal and
payment forms have no effect). Hence:
Hypothesis 2: Lump sum payment saving schemes will cause a higher incidence of
later planned retirement than annuity payment schemes.
Moreover, the gap between the left-hand and right-hand sides of equation (2.7) re-
ﬂects the larger proportionof early retirees under the annuity scheme i.e. the wider the
gapin equation(2.7),thewiderthe rangeofvaluesofe whichmightonlybesatisﬁed in
equation (2.6) but not in equation (2.5). Equation (2.7) shows that the more impulsive
the individual is (the lower β is), the wider the gap will be. This is because an decrease
in the β parameter lowers only the left hand side of this condition, reﬂecting the lower
utility (from the point of view of period 1) of taking a lump-sum and overconsuming
in the second period. From the point of view of the period 1 planner, annuities have a
11commitment value, which means they could take earlier retirement without being con-
cerned that they will have limited remaining resources in the ﬁnal period. Thus, the
measure of impulsiveness has some role in determining the retirement plans of the two
payment groups. This gives:
Hypothesis 3: Impulsiveness increases the incidence of later retirement in the lump-
sum group, relative to the annuity group.
In addition to Hypothesis 3, impulsiveness alone should not have a partial effect on
retirement timing, only an effect through the interaction with group membership.
On the other hand, increasing γ (increasing risk aversion) at ﬁrst widens the the
size of this gap, but after a certain point, begins to decrease it. Therefore, the measure
of risk aversion has an ambiguous effect on the retirement plans of the two groups.
The preference for delaying retirement in the lump-sum group is driven by the utility
loss (from the period one perspective) from either too high period 2 consumption (due
to the quasi-hyperbolic discounting) or greater exposure to longevity risk under the
lump-sum scheme (due to q<1 and risk aversion).
2.2.2 Actual retirement
The actual retirement decision takes place in period 2 – either the individual takes
immediate retirement or delays it until the ﬁnal period. The individual in a lump sum
















































As before, this can be rearranged to give a condition for early retirement on e:



























By a similar process, the individual in an annuity scheme will retire in period 2 if:


















Hypothesis 4: Individuals with higher utility of leisure will retire earlier.
Lowering β increases early retirement across both groups by reducing the threshold





, which appears in in both of the above conditions.
Hence:
Hypothesis 5: More impulsive individuals will retire earlier.
13In addition, the lump sum would lead to more people taking early retirement than



























This is satisﬁed if risk aversion is not too high and that q is not too low. As the
value of γ increases and q decreases, the immediate utility gain to a myopicindividuals
of early retirement is outweighed by the exposure to longevity risk. Tables 2.1 and 2.2
show this.
Table 2.1: Payment system causing higher incidence of early retirement, q =0 .9
β
γ 0.5 0.7 0.9
0.2 Lump-sum Lump-sum Annuity
0.5 Lump-sum Annuity Annuity
0.8 Lump-sum Annuity Annuity
Table 2.2: Payment system higher incidence of early retirement, q =0 .5
β
γ 0.5 0.7 0.9
0.2 Lump-sum Lump-sum Annuity
0.5 Annuity Annuity Annuity
0.8 Annuity Annuity Annuity
The effect of being in the lump-sum group is therefore ambiguous on the ﬁnal
distribution of retirement decisions. When q<1, it depends on the relative number
of low-β individuals relative to high-γ households, with the former more likely to
retire early under the lump-sum scheme and the latter more likely to retire early under
the annuity scheme. However, in the case where q =1 , there is no longevity risk,
so annuities act as a commitment mechanism over consumption, lowering utility to the
period2 individualby not allowingfora free choiceoverconsumption. Inthis case, the
14lump-sumalways leads to more earlier retirementthan the annuity scheme, as equation
(2.10) is always satisﬁed for any combination of β and γ. Hence:
Hypothesis6: Lumpsumpaymentsavingschemesleadtoa higherincidenceofearly
retirement than annuity payment schemes (if q is sufﬁciently high)
2.2.3 Inconsistencies
There is a welfare cost from unplanned early retirement. The scale of this potential in-
consistencycanbeexpressedbysubtractingthethresholdforleisureutilityincondition
(2.8) from that in condition (2.5) for the lump-sum group, and the threshold for leisure
utility in condition (2.9) from condition (2.6) for the annuity group. If the former is
smaller than the later, then there is unplanned early retirement, with the magnitude of
the different indicating the range of individuals that would be affected by it. If this gap
is labeled Gls and Ga for lump-sum and annuities respectively then:

































As the term in brackets is positive – the positive item is larger than the negative
item in both cases, as the numerator is larger and the denominator is smaller) then this
leads to:
Hypothesis 7: Impulsiveness drives unplanned early retirement.
15Finally, Gls and Ga differ by the negative ﬁnal term. By observation, the term in
Gls will be smaller than in Ga, when β<1 and 1
γ < −1. Therefore:
Hypothesis 8: Lump sum payment saving schemes lead to a higher incidence of
unplanned early retirement than annuity payment schemes
3 Testing the model
This paper looks to test these hypotheses using a laboratory experiment. The only
existing experiment which has looked at retirement and pension payouts is by Fatas
et al. (2007). This looks at ways to encourage later retirement through the design on
pension payouts, which would help ease the ﬁnancing pressures currently faced on
pension schemes worldwide by reducing the dependency ratio (the number of retirees
to employees in an economy). The paper argues that whilst much of the existing liter-
ature has focused on the way that pension schemes may encourage earlier retirement
because after a certain age the accumulation of further pension rights is not actuarially
fair (leading to an implicit tax on labour force participation), there may be distortions
even within an actuarially fair system arising through the timing of pension payments.
They propose a number of behaviorial reasons for this, such as greater patience for
larger rewards, hyperbolic discounting, and an inability to compute complicated pay-
ments2.
They tested this hypothesis using a laboratory experiment. The experiment had
ﬁfteen rounds, each with a given conditional probability of surviving, and participants
2As will be discussed later in this section, the explanation relating to hyperbolic discounting is not con-
vincing for two reasons. Firstly, it fails to take into account the potential time inconsistency in the leisure
choice – annuities limit immediate consumption, which make unplanned early retirement less affordable.
Secondly, hyperbolic discounting causes impulsiveness. It implies high discount rates for immediate pay-
offs, which would have a larger negative effect on delaying lump-sum payments, rather than annuities. Part
of an annuity’s value is received much later on, when discount rates are much lower and individuals are more
patient, implying they would, in part, be more willing to delay retirement to receive higher payments.
16were asked to choose a round to determine their payoffs. This is the equivalent of a
retirementage, whereindividualsreceivetheirpensiononcetheyhaveleft. Participants
received their pension as either a lump-sum or an annuity, which they knew about in
advance. The two schemes are actuarially fair - regardless of retirement timing, the
expected payment is equal to 100.
The authors found that the retirement age was signiﬁcantly higher for those in the
lump-sum group than in the annuity group. However, there are several important prob-
lems with this approach that casts doubt over this conclusion. First of all, this exper-
iment does not consider time – the experiment is played within a single session, so
regardless of the choice of round, payment was made at essentially the same time. Es-
sentially, then, this experiment offered a choice between lotteries with equal expected
values, rather than choices over time. Secondly, as a consequence of not looking at
the time dimension, the experiment has no role for the utility of leisure (or the disutil-
ity of work) and the effect this may have on the retirement decision. Individuals are
maximizing their monetary payoff alone, given their attitudes towards risk and their
perception about rewards (the experiment does not explain how actuarially fair pen-
sion work, so participants are left to make their own evaluation about their expected
payments). Finally, and most importantly, the reported retirement ages are planned,
rather than actual. By the design of the experiment, there is no scope for changing
plans, whereas the contention of this paper is that lump-sum pensions are more likely
to lead to unplanned earlier retirement. In contrast, the experiment presented in this
paper captures all of these elements.
4 Experimental design
This section sets out the design of the experiment. Participants were allocated to either
the lump sum group or the annuity group upon arrival in the ﬁrst week. They were in-
formedof their group,and givena remindercard to take away. In the ﬁrst experimental
17session, they completed three games: the Delayed Reward game, the Preferred Lottery
game and the Retirement game.
4.1 Delayed Reward game
All participants, regardless of their group, completed a money pairs exercise. This is
called the Delayed Reward Game. This is designed to time preferences by ﬁtting a
quasi-hyperbolicdiscount function. Each question in this exercise had the same form:
• Respondents are asked to state their preference between £x today and £y after a
delay of t, where x = {1,...,15},y=1 5and t = {1 week, 2 weeks, 3 weeks,
1 month, 2 months six months}
• The choice pairs start with smallest delay (t = 1 week) and the smallest imme-
diate reward (x =£1)
• x is increased by £1 increments. At some point, the individual will shift to
preferring the immediate reward. The indifference point lies between those two
reward-pairs.
• Once xreaches its maximumvalue, the delaymoveto nextsmallest (t = 2days).
Process repeats for all t.
• Three choiceswere chosenat randomto receivepaymentbased onreportedpref-
erence.
4.2 Preferred Lottery game
Secondly,the individualscompletedan exercise to measure their risk preferences. This
game again asks participants to choose between two possible rewards, however instead
of an immediate and a delayed reward, the choices are between a certain payment and
a lottery, which only pays out a certain amount with a given probability (otherwise it
pays nothing). The procedure is as follows:
18• Respondents are asked to report preference between £x for certain and £y paid
with a probability of z, where x =0 .50,...,10,y=1 0and z = {0.2,0.5,0.8}
• Probability is explained as a random draw from a bag of ten balls, where 10z
of the balls are red, and the remainder are black. The lottery pays out if the
participant draws a red ball.
• The choice pairs start with smallest certain payment (x =0 .50) and the simplest
lottery (z =0 .5).
• x is increased until individual prefers certain payment. This is the certainty
equivalent of the lottery.
• Repeat for other two lotteries.
• Two choices are chosen at random to receive payment based on reported prefer-
ence.
4.3 Retirement game
Finally, the individuals were shown the Retirement game, which is the main part of the
experiment, as it collects the dependent variables in this analysis: planned and actual
weeks for leaving the game, and hence the inconsistencies between the two. The rules,
which were explained to the participants, were as follows:
• This game is conducted over eight weeks. Every week participants are asked
to come back to the lab. These sessions last approximately ten minutes. The
sessions were at the same time each week.
• The experiment pays participants based on their choices, as follows. Each week
that a participant comes to the lab, they receive a wage of £4. Half of that wage
– £2 – can be taken away at the end of the session. The remaining half is saved.
19• Participants are told that they can stop coming to the lab any week. When they
do they will begin to receive their savings. Depending on which group they have
been allocated to, they either receive all of their savings as one lump-sum on the
week when they stopped coming to the lab, or they receive the pot as regular
equal payments over the remaining weeks of the experiment.
• The saving pot earns a 0% interest rate.
• Participants are told that they will not have to come to the lab to receive their
savings. The savings are paid directly to the participants at their postal address3.
• Participants are told that as they only get the savings after they leave the game
and that the game only lasts for eight weeks, then, no-one is expected to come to
the lab in week eight.
The retirement payments are summarized in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Retirement game payouts









Participants were thenshown a cardwhich describes the paymentsthey will receive
in each week, givena particular leaving week. They were only shown the payments for
the group they are in – either annuity or lump sum. They could read off, for a given a
week of leaving the experiment the exact amount that they would be paid each week.
The participants were given the opportunity to ask questions about the instructions,
3As all the participants were students, payments were made to their university pigeon holes
20after which, participants are asked to report in which week they would most prefer to
leave the game and not return to the lab.
On the basis of a experimental trial, survival probabilities were not included in the
ﬁnal design, as they appeared to confuse participants.
4.3.1 Individual information
Atthe endoftheexperiment,individualscompleteashortquestionnairetocollectbasic
data on age, gender and status (as all participants were students, this distinguishes
between undergraduates and postgraduates). It also includes two measures of how
arduousparticipatingin the experimentis. Firstly, it asks how muchtime the individual
has to give up to come to the laboratory, excluding time spent in the laboratory –
essentially, this captured traveling time to the laboratory from the participants’ home
or place of work. Secondly, it asks whether any monetary costs were incurred by the
individual in coming to the lab. Examples include bus fare (or similar) and any lost
earnings.
4.3.2 Follow-up experiments
All the sessions after week one are linked to the Retirement game. In all these sessions,
participantscompletedsomevariationofoneofthegamesplayedintheﬁrstweek. This
simulates work in the experiment, so that not returning to the lab in a week is taken as
retirement. The table 4.2 below summarizes the games played.
The week where the participant did not return to the laboratory was recorded. All
the data collected in the follow-up sessions was only of secondary importance to the
main retirementexperiment. The main purposeof these tasks was to give participantsa
mundane and predictable task to complete whilst in the laboratory. Responses to these
tasks are not analysed in this paper.
21Table 4.2: Follow-up experiments
Week Game Variation
2 Delayed Reward Larger rewards
3 Delayed Reward Rewards were a ’holiday’ from
a hypothetical time commitment
4 Delayed Reward Larger rewards
5 Retirement Game Hypothetical, shorter periods
6 Delayed Reward None
7 No game Individuals were told they had
no tasks upon arrival
5 Data
The experiment was conducted using 30 University of Oxford student volunteers, both
undergraduate and postgraduate, who were contacted to participate by the Centre of
Experimental Social Sciences at Nufﬁeld College, University of Oxford. As the exper-
iment was conducted over eight weeks, a judgement was made that non-student volun-
teers would be less likely to be able to commit to a certain time and more likely to ex-
perienceunexpectedchangesin their schedule that would preventthem from returning.
Moreover, focusing on student volunteers allowed payment of their post-retirement
earnings to be completed without the individual needing to give up any more of their
time, which was important in distinguishing between the ’work’ phase and the ’retire-
ment’ phase of the experiment, but without having to use the postal service. All post-
retirement savings were left at the students’ pigeon holes in their respective colleges,
which are conveniently central for delivery.
The experiment was conducted in two waves, the ﬁrst of 15 students between Jan-
uary and March 2010, and the second of 15 students between April and June 2010.
Eachparticipantwas informedin advanceof the time requirementsthat wouldbe asked
ofthem, and asked to volunteeronly if theybelievedthe time of eachsession was avail-
able. The ﬁrst session lasted 90 minutes, and participants were paid £8 for showing up,
comprising a £6 participation payment and a further £2 which was their weekly wage
for the ﬁrst week. In addition £2 was placed in each individuals saving account. In the
22ﬁrst session, individuals played the Delayed Rewards Game, the Retirement Game and
the Preferred Lottery Game. In addition to their show-up fee, ﬁve of the choices from
the Delayed Rewards Game and the Preferred Lottery Game were selected at random
and payment was made based on those choices. Individuals were randomly allocated
into one of the two groups (Annuity and Lump-Sum) by drawing a number which cor-
responded to a computer terminal in the lab. The ﬁrst half of the terminals were in the
Lump-Sum group and the remainder in the Annuity group.
Each following session lasted approximately ﬁfteen minutes. Remaining partici-
pants were emailed two days before the experiment to remind them of the time of the
next session, and were told how much they had currently accumulated, how much they
would receive if they left the game that week, dependent on which group they were in,
and how much they would receive if they came to the lab that week. They were asked
to email the CESS lab if they could not attend a session for some exogenous reason
(such as illness or an appointment), rather than because they did not want to return
anymore. These individuals were treated as if they had retired from the game and so
did not return in future weeks, however, their data is essentially incomplete. Three
participants data was removedfrom the experimentbecause they were unable to attend
a session due to external commitments.
The experiment was programmed and conducted using the software z-Tree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007).
5.1 Discount functions
Discount functions are identiﬁed from the indifference points between immediate and
delayed choices. The aim is to produce a measure of an individual’s impulsiveness.
For a quasi-hyperbolic discounter, this is the variable β in the discount function:
D(t)=βδt (5.1)
23Utility is assumed to be linear in the reward. Let Xit be the immediate reward
where participants switch from delayed reward to immediate reward (when the imme-
diate reward option is ascending) and the ﬁnal immediate reward prior to the point
where individuals switch from delayed reward to immediate reward (when the imme-
diate reward is descending). This is the point that will be used as the indifferencepoint
between the immediate and delayed rewards. This point was chosen rather than the
mid-point of the two rewards where preferences change from delayed reward to imme-
diate reward because there are a number of individuals who always choose the delayed
reward of £15 except when the immediate reward is also the same. If the midpoint
between the switching pairs was used, this would be at 14.5 for all values, implying
β<1 and δ =1 . It seems much more probable that these participants’ discount
functions have β =1and δ =1 .
It would be possible to construct a complicated model to estimate using maximum
likelihood. However, for simplicity, it is possible to get a reasonable ﬁrst approxima-
tion of the discount function, and crucially the measure of impulsiveness by estimating
the two preference parameters via ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of the fol-
lowing:
lnXit =l n ( 1 5 βit)+tlnδit + eit (5.2)
where eit is distributed normally with a mean of zero.
By doing both ascending and descending rounds for each delay, some errors in re-
porting are mitigated. The Delayed Reward data was cleaned where one indifference
point is missing because the participants report preferring delayed rewards for all im-
mediate rewards, with the response for the alternative question used in its place. One
participant’s data was dropped because their reported time preferences seemed to be
24far outside of the quasi-hyperbolicdiscounting framework 4.
As there may be some error in estimating the preference parameter β, I create a
dummy variable for being impulsive (or being a quasi-hyperbolic discounter rather
than an exponential discounter), which takes a value of 1 if β<0.94. This cut-off
point was conveniently suggested by the data, as there are two clear groups observable
with the estimation: β<0.94 and β>0.98.
Table 5.1 below summarizes the estimation of the discount functions for partici-
pants.
5.2 Risk preferences
Risk preferences were identiﬁed using reported certainty equivalents. I assume a con-
stant absolute risk aversion functional form for the individuals preferences, because
estimating this did not require knowledge of the participants total wealth. Hence, we
have a series of observations.
ui(xp)=pui(10) + (1 − p)ui(10) (5.3)
where xp is the amount the individual receive for certain that make him or her
indifferent to a lottery which £10 with probability p and zero with probability 1 − p,
and ui(x)=−exp−γx. Following a similar method to the estimation of the discount





To get a measure of risk, the following equation is estimated using ordinary least
squares and the indifference points {Xp}p=0.2,0.5,0.8.
4They reported a preference for the immediate reward only if it was £15 in all cases, except for the longest










where ep is error term which is assumed to be normally distributed with a zero
mean. Again, this method does not accurately derive risk preferences particularly as
there is only three observations in the Lottery game. However, it does give a measure
of the risk preferences and the curvature of the individual’s utility function. As with
the time preferences, I add a variable for the individual being risk averse (over small
rewards)whichtakesthe valueof1if γ>0.03. Again,thiscut-offpointwas suggested
by the data, as almost all the observations fall into one of two groups: γ>0.03
and γ<0.00, with the latter also including apparently risk-loving individuals. Two
participantsdid not give indifferencepoints for one or moreof the lotteries (stating that
they preferredall lotteries to the for-certain amount),so their risk preferenceparameter
is missing.
5.3 Leisure utility
The ﬁnal preference parameter captured by the experiment is the the value the indi-
vidual places on the time they give up to participate each week. After each week’s
experiment, participants were asked how much time and money they had given up to
participatein the experiment. No participantsreporteda monetarycost of participating,
so the measure of leisure utility will focus on the time cost. For consistency, they were
asked not to include time actually spent in the laboratory.
Initially, the measure of the leisure utility was going to be the ﬁrst week’s response,
which everyone gave answers to. However, the data revealed two possible problems
with answers to this question. One respondent reported giving up 105 minutes to come
to the laboratory on the ﬁrst week, and 5 minutes in the subsequent week, before leav-
ing the experiment. A second participant reported giving up 120 minutes for the ﬁrst
26week experiment, and did not return in following weeks to validate this. One explana-
tion of this is that they had includedthe length of the experimentin their answer for the
ﬁrst week. Including such high value outliers, especially for early leavers, might bias
the results.
To deal with this problem, two measures of time cost were derived, both of which
are tested in the statistical analysis as they each have potential problems. The ﬁrst used
the ﬁrst week’s reported time but omitted any response above 90 minutes, which was
the length of the experiment that week. The second was the mean reported amount of
time given up to participate across all weeks where individuals returned to the labora-
tory, up to the ﬁfth week. Again, the two participants reporting above 90 minutes in
the ﬁrst week were omitted. This has the advantageof smoothingout any erroneousre-
sponses to this question overthe course of the experiment. However,it has a numberof
disadvantages as well. Firstly, participants may learn to incorporate the trip to the lab
into their scheduleis less costly ways. This informationis not useful forplannedretire-
ment, which should be based on anticipated costs of coming to the lab in week 1, not
any subsequent adaptation. Secondly, this is a methodologically inconsistent measure,
because for some participants it takes just one observation, whereas for others it takes
ﬁve. These observations are noisy measures of time cost. For example, participants
may conveniently ﬁnd themselves nearer the lab one week, or have further to travel
to their next appointment the following week. This may mean that the measurement
errors of this variable are correlated with the actual retirement decision.
Using this time as a measure of the disutility of coming to the lab assumes that
all participants have equal utility values for time. The participants were selected from
undergraduate and postgraduate students at Oxford University, which is a relatively
homogeneous group, particularly in terms of demands on their time. There may be
some variation between postgraduate and undergraduate valuations of time – due to
different workloads, responsibilities and employment.
27Table 5.1: Estimates of preference parameter for experiment participants
Subject no BETA DELTA IMPULSIVE GAMMA RISK AVERSE TIME1 TIME2
1 1.000 1.000 No 0.044 Yes 20.00 1.003
2 0.983 0.997 No 0.056 Yes 20.00 0.00
3 1.104 0.917 No –– 20.00 13.33
4 1.063 0.960 No 0.007 No 5.00 2.00
5 0.917 0.977 Yes 0.025 No 20.00 15.00
6 0.896 0.987 Yes 0.031 Yes 40.00 27.00
7 0.807 0.961 Yes 0.032 Yes 30.00 30.00
8 0.884 0.954 Yes -0.009 No 20.00 20.00
9 0.898 0.972 Yes 0.0000 No 20.00 20.00
10 1.000 1.000 No –– 30.00 30.00
11 1.043 0.896 No 0.027 No 1.00 4.20
13 0.880 0.958 Yes 0.000 No 20.00 17.50
14 1.008 0.982 No 0.031 Yes 30.00 33.00
15 0.850 0.960 Yes -0.002 No ––
16 1.046 0.982 No 0.032 Yes 0.00 23.00
17 0.986 0.994 No -0.006 No 10.00 7.50
18 0.936 0.981 Yes 0.016 No ––
20 0.986 0.984 No 0.062 Yes 0.00 0.00
21 0.919 0.984 Yes -0.047 No 60.00 60.00
22 1.141 0.892 No 0.035 Yes 40.00 41.25
23 0.939 0.998 Yes 0.000 No 60.00 60.00
25 0.960 0.992 No 0.014 No 2.00 21.40
26 1.000 1.000 No 0.061 Yes 0.00 0.00
27 1.014 0.985 No 0.062 Yes 2.00 3.50
29 1.001 0.981 No 0.053 Yes 10.00 10.00
30 1.017 0.990 No 0.000 No 10.00 10.00
Table 5.1 gives the estimated preference parameters for the 26 participants used in
the subsequent analysis.
6 Results
Figures 6.1and 6.2 show the actual retirement decisions of participants in each group,
and the gap between this and their planned retirement.
The statistical analysis looks at planned and actual retirement and the retirement
gap in turn.































Firstly, consider the planned leaving week reported in the ﬁrst week experiment. The
most striking observation is that a large majority – around 65% of participants – re-
ported that they would remain in the experiment until the ﬁnal week. There is much
more variation in the actual week of leaving. Moreover, there is very limited correla-
tion between plans and actual leaving week - a simple correlation calculation estimates
r =0 .32, while the p-value of a Kendall’s τ test of the hypothesis that the two vari-
ables are independentis 0.208. This suggests that manyparticipantsdidnot necessarily
make their decision in the way that reﬂected their actual preferences. One possibility
is that some participants ﬁxated on the eighth week because they were told in advance
that this was an eight-week experiment and that to participate, they needed to be avail-
able at the same time over that period. Alternatively, they may have ﬁxated on the
largest total payoff, and disregardedother information(for example, how costly it was,
in terms of time and effort, to come to the lab).
It is interesting to compare the mean characteristics of the two types of participants
– those that reported a plan to remain in the experiment until the ﬁnal week, and those
who reported a plan to leave at some point prior to that – to see whether there are
any signiﬁcant differences between their respective members. These data shows that
there are no signiﬁcant differences by either measure of leisure utility e, impulsiveness
(either the raw measure β, or the dummy variable), impatience (from the estimated pa-
rameter δ), risk aversion (either the raw measure γ or the dummy variable) or payment
group. However, there does appear to be differences between the two groups of indi-
viduals in terms of the time consistency of the plans they made, captured by the gap
between planned and actual retirement. This is true for both the raw gap, and for a a
dummy variable which takes a value of one if the magnitude of the gap is no more than
one. Table 6.1 shows the differences between the mean values of all these variables
across the two groups. Differences are tested using a one-side Student’s t-test of the
31Table 6.1: Average characteristics of planners and non-planners
Mean p-values
Non-planner Planner Difference Student’s t-test Mann-Whitney U-test
DELTA 0.9750 0.9677 0.0073 0.720 0.553
BETA 0.9662 0.9836 -0.0173 0.314 0.627
IMPULSIVE 0.4118 0.3333 0.0784 0.355 0.701
CARA 0.0228 0.0198 0.0030 0.391 0.830
RISK AVERSE 0.5000 0.3750 0.1250 0.293 0.571
TIME COST1 16.813 25.125 -8.313 0.141 0.237
TIME COST2 17.420 23.494 -6.073 0.207 0.500
LUMPSUM 0.5294 0.5556 -0.0261 0.453 0.901
GAP 3.2353 1.2222 2.0131 0.010*** 0.025**
INCONSISTENT 0.7059 0.3333 0.3725 0.042** 0.073*
N1 7 9
Signiﬁcance: * = 10% level or less, **= 5% level or less, ***= 1% level or less
means (where the inequality is determined by common sense, so, for example, a test
whether planners are less impulsive or impatient, or by the actual sign of the difference
if no common sense prediction exists) and the Mann-Whitney U-test. It shows the the
individuals who planned to retire earlier than week eight actually left the experiment
more than two weeks closer to their plan than the other group. To an extent, this sup-
ports the interpretation of some of this latter group as non-planners in the sense that
their response did not represent their actual preferences over these choices over time
but instead reﬂected some other motivation.
Given that, it is unsurprising that planned retirement is hard to predict. In terms of
the predictions of the theory, payment type should delay planned retirement. Planned
retirement weeks are compared between the two payment groups. using both Student
t-tests and Mann-Whitney U-tests. The same tests are computed for the subsample
classed here as planners for comparison. The results are shown in Table 6.2. The
table also compares the difference in planned retirement between the two groups dis-
tinguished by impulsiveness and risk aversion, for completeness.
Paymentgrouphasnoeffectonthe plannedretirementageforeitherthefullsample
or the smaller subsample of planners. There is also little evidence that impulsiveness
32Table 6.2: Planned retirement tests
Mean retirement p-values
Annuity Lump-sum Difference Student’s t-test Mann-Whitney U-test
All 7.00 7.14 -0.14 0.414 0.928
N1 2 1 4
Planner 5.00 5.60 -0.60 0.319 0.900
N5 4
Non-impulsive Impulsive Difference Student’s t-test Mann-Whitney U-test
All 7.25 6.80 0.45 0.251 1.000
N1 6 1 0
Planner 6.00 4.00 2.00 0.052* 0.112
N6 3
Risk neutral Risk averse Difference Student’s t-test Mann-Whitney U-test
All 6.62 7.75 -0.930 0.091* 0.369
N1 3 1 1
Planner 4.40 6.63 -2.23 0.066* 0.129
N5 3
Signiﬁcance: * = 10% level or less, **= 5% level or less, ***= 1% level or less
or risk aversion mattered in this decision, even for the subsample. More impulsive and
less risk averse individuals plan to leave the experiment earlier on average; however,
these differences are not signiﬁcant (at the 10% level) when evaluated using the non-
parametric Mann-Whitney test. Note, however, that impulsiveness and risk aversion
are not predicted to have a standalone effect on planned retirement from the model, but
through their interaction with payment group. Investigating this interaction further is
not possible, given the lack of variation in the planned retirement decision. Moreover,
as payment group is not an important factor in either planned or, as shown in the next
section, actual retirement choices (likely because of the small-rewards nature of the
experiment) then it seems unlikely such interaction effects would be found.
The other variable predicted to explain anything about planned retirement is the
cost of time. Table 6.3 shows estimates of correlations between planned retirement
and both of the time cost variables. Moreover, it presents the p-values of two non-
parametric tests of the hypothesis that these two variables are independent.
These tests were also replicated for the planner sub-sample, and in all cases, no
33Table 6.3: Correlation tests between time cost and planned retirement
Pearson’s r Spearman’s ρ Kendall’s τ
TIME1 -0.368* -0.268 -0.160
(0.077) (0.206) (0.193)
TIME2 -0.361* -0.176 -0.120
(0.083) (0.410) (0.340)
Signiﬁcance: * = 10% level or less, **= 5% level or less, ***= 1% level or less
correlation was signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
In conclusionfor this section, participantsdid not, in general,make plans overtheir
leaving that reﬂected preferences over discounting, risk or the cost of their effort, nor
their payment group. Participants may have ﬁxated on week 8, having been told in
advance that the experiment ran for up to eight weeks and that only people who had
this time free to potentially come to the lab should apply. It is also possible that they
were not able to appreciate the costs involved in making their decision. For example,
they may not have had an understanding of how arduous the act of routinely coming
back to the lab may have been, and, disregarding this aspect of the choice, focused
purely on the potentially monetary reward, which is maximised in the ﬁnal week.
Although this has proven less useful for investigating the hypotheses set out in the
model, it has raised some interesting issues about the way individuals may make plans
over time. Further experiments of this sort should attempt to incentivise participants to
report plans which better reﬂect preferences. Moreover, they should take into account
the possibility of learning – that is, where individuals make choices based on their
preferences, but with poor information about the future costs of those plans. In this
case, it may be the individuals did not really appreciate how costly or inconvenient
coming to the lab would be for them.
6.2 Actual retirement
Unlike the reported planned retirement, actual retirement should reﬂect actual pref-
erences. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show that there is signiﬁcantly more variation in actual
34leaving weeks comparedto plannedleaving weeks. The theorypredicts that impulsive-
ness, payment group and time costs should all impacted upon actual leaving week. To
test the ﬁrst two, I compare retirement ages across the two groups, as shown in Table
6.4 below.
Table 6.4: Actual retirement tests
Mean retirement p-values
Non-impulsive Impulsive Difference Student’s t-test Mann-Whitney U-test
5.31 3.30 2.01 0.005*** 0.011**
N1 6 1 0
Annuity Lump-sum Difference Student’s t-test Mann-Whitney U-test
4.50 4.57 -0.07 0.465 0.833
N1 2 1 4
Signiﬁcance: * = 10% level or less, **= 5% level or less, ***= 1% level or less
These tests show that impulsiveness is a signiﬁcant factor in predicting actual re-
tirement timing. Impulsive participants leave the experimentapproximatelytwo weeks
earlier than non-impulsive participants. Payment group, on the other hand, had no
signiﬁcant effect.
The role of time cost on actual retirement is again tested by looking at correlations,
show in table 6.5
Table 6.5: Correlation tests between time cost and actual retirement
Pearson’s r Spearman’s ρ Kendall’s τ
TIME1 -0.330 -0.333 -0.243*
(0.115) (0.112) (0.087)
TIME2 -0.288 -0.242 -0.170
(0.171) (0.254) (0.241)
Signiﬁcance: * = 10% level or less, **= 5% level or less, ***= 1% level or less
The ﬁrst measure of time cost, which is based on week 1 reports, seems to have
predictivevalue. The hypothesisthat the two variables are uncorrelatedis rejected by a
Kendall’s τ test at the 10% level. Moreover, the p-values on the other two coefﬁcients
are close to 0.1.
In conclusion for this section, unlike planned retirement, actual retirement seems
35Table 6.6: Inconsistent retirement timing
Planner Non-planner All
Impulsive 0.667 0.857 0.800
Not Impulsive 0.166 0.600 0.438
Difference 0.500* 0.257 0.363**
Student’s t-test ( p-value) 0.085 0.140 0.037
Mann-Whitney U test(p-value) 0.157 0.266 0.074*
N 9 17 26
Signiﬁcance: * = 10% level or less, **= 5% level or less, ***= 1% level or less
to reﬂect preferences. Individuals with higher discount factors (through their impul-
siveness) and higher costs of participation (through the time taken to come to the lab)
leave the experiment earlier. This accords with the model.
6.3 Inconsistency
The gap between planned and actual retirement is caused by either genuine time-
inconsistencies (potentially driven by impulsiveness) or because participants formed
meaningless initial plans (in terms of their actual preferences). Table 6.6 compares
means of the dummy variable for time consistent retirement between the impulsive
and not impulsive members of the two subsamples, and the sample as a whole. So,
for example, it shows that in the R<8 group (or planner group), two-thirds of those
who were impulsive had time inconsistent retirement plans, whilst on one-sixth of the
non-impulsiveparticipants in this group were time inconsistent when reportingleaving
week. For each of the three samples, I test the hypothesis that the impulsive mem-
bers of the group make fewer time-inconsistent choices than the non-impulsive, using
a one-sided Student’s t-test and the Mann Whitney U test. The p-values for these test
are given in the table below.
The table shows that in the planner group, impulsive individuals are signiﬁcantly
more likely to make time-inconsistent choices, whilst the non-planner group does not
exhibit a signiﬁcant difference between the impulsive and non-impulsive members.
36This is likely because, by virtue of not make accurate plans, most non-planners make
inconsistent plans regardless of their time preferences.
Table 6.1 showed that those in the plannergrouphad signiﬁcantly smaller inconsis-
tencies that the non-planner group, reﬂecting some attention being paid to their prefer-
ences in making a plan. This analysis has then showed that of those inconsistencies, it
is theimpulsiveindividualswhopredominantlymakethem. IfIincludeall participants,
the difference in the means is strongly signiﬁcant, even though it includes some of the
non-planners who inconsistent plans do not reﬂect time preference. This indicates that
there are some individuals in the R =8group who did make proper plans, and that
their data, combined with the planner group, is sufﬁcient to generate a difference in
time-consistent behaviour across the whole sample that is signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Tocompletetheanalysis,thesamestatistical tests arerunforthethreegroups(plan-
ner,non-planner,all)fortherawgapbetweenplannedandactualretirement,ratherthan
the inconsistency dummy. The results of these are shown in the table below.
Table 6.7: Retirement plan gap
R<8 R =8 All
Impulsive 1.667 4.286 3.500
Not Impulsive 1.000 2.500 1.938
Difference 0.667 1.786 1.563
Student’s t-test ( p-value) 0.322 0.035** 0.036**
Mann-Whitney U test(p-value) 0.429 0.077* 0.078*
N 9 17 26
Signiﬁcance: * = 10% level or less, **= 5% level or less, ***= 1% level or less
This table showsthat while thosein the non-plannergroupare notstatistically more
likely to make an inconsistent choice based on impulsiveness, the size of any incon-
sistencies is signiﬁcantly larger for lower β individuals. Of course, this is explained
by the results in the previous section, where actual retirement depends signiﬁcantly
on impulsiveness. Those in the planner group, on the other hand, are more likely to
make inconsistent choices if they are impulsive. Table 6.7 shows that the the size of
that inconsistency is not generally large. Hence, when looking at the raw gap between
37planned and actual retirement, those in the planner group do not exhibit signiﬁcant
differences.
6.4 Discussion of results
The lack of any real explanatory power of the payment group variable is in contrast to
both the theoretical model developed at the start of this section and the existing exper-
imental evidence. I would argue that the reason for this is because the experimental
approach can only replicate some parts of the lifecycle consumption model in a small-
scale laboratory setting. For example, it can creating a work task by asking individuals
to give up some time in exchange for a small wage and a growing saving pot. How-
ever,the modeldevelopedat the beginningof this paper suggestedthat annuitieshave a
commitment value in that they limit over-consumption,which makes earlier retirement
possible for impulsive individuals. Unlike in the model, the actual payout to partici-
pantsis onlyasmall partofthewealth thatthepersonhasoutsideoftheexperiment. As
a result, individuals are not credit-constrained in the way imagined by the theoretical
modelandcantransferlater annuitypaymentsintoimmediateconsumption. Therefore,
ﬁnding a positive relationship between of lump-sum payments and earlier retirement,
and between these payments and the size of the timing inconsistency, was less likely,
because there is no such commitment value due to the small size of the rewards paid
out to participants.
These results do, however,is questionthe idea that individualswill planfor later re-
tirement if they receive a lump-sum payment (Orzag, 2001). This conclusion has been
supported by a small-rewards experiment. However, their results related to the speciﬁc
designoftheirexperiment,whichisessentiallyachoicebetweenlotterieswithidentical
expected values, and which does not allow for changing plans and time-inconsistency
because there is no time element included. This is not to say that these conclusions
do not reveal anything useful about the decision-making process of individuals which
38could be exploited by a policymaker looking to encourage later retirement; however, it
omits important elements of the retirement choice. This experiment has replaced their
lottery with a set of choices over time and rejects the hypothesis that payment type .
Clearly, there is need for further work here to determine whether the effect I describe
in the model could be found in experimental data. One way to do this might be to
run a similar experiment where the payments are non-transferable over time. There
are ways to achieve this, but it would require moving away from money payments and
controlling consumption choices.
This conclusion also suggests something about the role of impulsiveness in this ex-
periment. In the model, unplanned early retirement occured for two reasons – because
immediate leisure utility became relatively more desirable, and because it permitted
higher immediate consumption through the receipt of the pension. One concern I had
prior to running the experiment is that discount functions were derived using choices
over money, and that it was possible that an individual could be a quasi-hyperbolic
discounter over money rewards, but not leisure, and vice versa. However, the lack of
signiﬁcance of payment group suggests that over such small rewards, individuals are
not sufﬁciently credit-constrained that the timing of these payments matter. Conse-
quently, it can not be the promise of immediate payments that causes earlier retirement
(as participants can replicate a pension payment through transfers over time), implying
that it is through the impulsive preference towards more immediate leisure utility that
is driving these results.
7 Conclusion
This paper has presented a theoretical model of retirement with individuals who are
quasi-hyperbolicdiscounters, building upon a model by Diamond and Koszegi (2003).
It derived a number of hypotheses about planned and actual retirement behaviour and
time-inconsistency, and attempted to test these hypotheses using a new experiment.
39The results of this experiment lead to three main conclusions
1. Individuals value their time, which is associated with their decision to leave the
experiment(Hypothesis 4).
2. Impulsiveness is associated with the decision to leave the experiment, but has no
relationship with the reported planned retirement. Consequently, impulsiveness
may explain inconsistency in the leaving decision (Hypothesis 5 and 7).
3. Contrary to the predictions of the model and existing evidence, payment type
have no signiﬁcant effect on any part of the leaving decision (Hypothesis 2, 3 6
and 8).
This ﬁnal point follows fromthe lack of commitmentvalue that annuities have over
lump-sum payments, due to the small rewards nature of the experiment. This suggests
that there is scope to improve on the experiment’s existing design to more comprehen-
sively test the hypothesis that payment type will affect the retirement decision.
This experiment has contributed to the literature in a number of broader ways.
It extends experimental approaches looking at time inconsistency to consider leisure
choices. Moreover, it adds to the small number of studies combining behavioral and
labour economics. To do this, it has developed a novel design whereby the task of
coming to the laboratory on a repeated basis becomes to decision variable of interest,
ratherthan anytask performedin the lab. The designof this experimentis uniqueto the
literature. However, I would argue that it is something that could be exploited further,
and in a particular, by labour economists with an interest in testing behaviouraltraits in
relation to more traditional models. By making the decision to come to the laboratory
crucial to the experiments outcome, we can potentially investigate economics choices
related to participation, search, investment and exit, all of which are potentially of
interest but none of which have, as yet, been investigated in a laboratory setting.
40Finally, there are potentially some interesting policy implications. These results
suggest that solutions to one time-consistency problem (forced saving through pen-
sions) may cause other time-consistency problems over other choices where commit-
ment is not possible (retirement). Secondly, there remains an open issue about the role
ofpensionpaymentsinretirementtiming. Strongeranswersonthis pointwouldalso be
interesting to policy makers, given the need to encourage later retirement and concerns
over the thinness of annuity markets.
References
Akin, Z. and Yavas, A. (2008), “An Experimental Analysis of Time-Inconsistency in
Long-Run Projects,” Working Paper,TOBB University of Economics and Technol-
ogy, Department of Economics.
Bassi, M. (2008), “An Egg Today and a Chicken Tomorrow: A Model of Social Secu-
rity with Hyperbolic Discounting,” CSEF Working Paper No. 205.
Diamond, P. (1977), “A framework for social security analysis,” Journal of Public
Economics, 8(3): 275–298.
Diamond, P. and Koszegi, B. (2003), “Quasi-Hyperbolic Preferences and Retirement,”
Journal of Public Economics, 87: 1839–1872.
DWP (2006), Security in Retirement: Towards a New Pensions System, London: The
Stationery Ofﬁce.
Fatas, E., Lacomba, J. and Lagos, F. (2007), “An experimental test on retirement deci-
sions,” Economic Inquiry, 45(3).
Fischbacher, U. (2007), “z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experi-
ments,” Experimental Economics, 10(2): 171–178.
41Frogneux, V. (2009), “Retirement Decision and Quasi Hyperbolic Discounting,” .
Holmes, C. (2010), “Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting and Retirement: A Comment,”
Journal of Public Economics, 94: 129–130.
— (2011), “Myopia and retirement planning,” Unpublished working paper.
Laibson, D. (1997), “Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 62: 443–77.
Orzag, P. (2001), “Should a Lump-Sum Payment Replace Social Security’s Delayed
Retirement Credit?” An Issue in Brief, 6: 1–10, Center for Retirement Research at
Boston College.
Strotz, R. H. (1956), “Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization,”
Review of Economic Studies, 23(3): 165–180.
Viscusi, W. K., Huber, J. and Bell, J. (2008), “Estimating discount rates for environ-
mental quality from utility-based choice experiments,” Journal of Risk and Uncer-
tainty, 37(2): 199–220.
42